Introduction
Despite the role that France played in pioneering the Evaluative State, it is evident that the French government faced a dilemma not very different from one that the UK had confronted a decade earlier. If higher education was to be 'freed' from the heavy hand of the state to benefit from the joys of competition between individual higher education establishments, a rather different approach was needed. It was not enough merely to make encouraging noises and gestures, and very particularly so given the growling hostility of two of the three Estates in the university world -the Academic and the Student Estates -to the notion of 'market forces' as the great liberator. However, it is one of the more remarkable paradoxes that neoliberalism, a doctrine wedded to rolling back the frontiers of the state, could advance only by rolling them forward. This bizarre example of policy's equivalent of cognitive dissonance is sometimes alluded to as 'Amaral's Paradox' (Amaral and Magalhães, 2007; Neave, 2008b) . It was as much in evidence with the sharp smack of government in Thatcherist Britain as it was in the higher education policy pursued under the presidencies of Messieurs Chirac and Sarkozy.
The second phase in the development of the French model of the Evaluative State injecting neoliberalism into higher education took place at two levels -within central government itself and within the individual university. The two thrusts of policy were closely related as much in terms of the overall strategy they introduced as in their timing. supérieur: AERES). As its title made plain, the Agency was to serve as the spearhead for overhauling both higher education and research. However, the greater weight of legislative effort bore down on the institutional level through the provisions in the 'Law bearing on Organizing the New University'.
Re-peopling the corridors of power
In its operational scope, the Agency differed markedly from its predecessor. Membership of its Governing Council (Conseil d'Administration) was slightly shaved -instead of 26 notable personages, the Agency contented itself with 25. Where significant change was to be seen, however, was in the interests and constituencies they represented, and in the balance between them. Nine 'qualified personalities', recognized for their scholarly achievement in France, the EU or enjoying international renown, bolstered the ranks of the Prominente. At least three of their numbers were drawn from the private research sector (Légifrance, 2009a). Higher education establishments were assigned seven representatives, chosen not just from academia but also from the technical services (ingénieurs) of higher education institutions, with a third constituency consisting of 'experts' who hailed from various evaluative bodies 'recognized as competent'. Also included were one senator and one deputy. Such a membership profile differed radically from that of the now defunct Comité National d'Evaluation, as it did in the political intention that its creation demonstrated.
Changes in membership heralded, officially and formally, a redoubling of the proactive strategy initially introduced five years previously. Once again, the driving force of reform focused around the agencies of central government. Also significant was the very real reduction in the numbers representing what may be described as the 'university presence', diluted on the one hand by the unprecedented and explicit inclusion of private sector research interests and on the other by the splitting of the university constituency among academic staff and senior members of university technical and support services. Far from being an independent body au-dessus de la mêlée, by dint of the make-up of its Governing Council, AERES took on all the trappings of a coordinating agency, acting within an a posteriori framework and with the clear remit of driving reform onward and downward, thereby strengthening evaluation yet further as a directive instrument. Thus, the
